We present a chosen ciphertext attack against an implementation of EPOC-2 in which it is possible to tell for what reason the decryption of a given ciphertext fails.
The Attack
We present a chosen ciphertext attack against this system in a manner similar to the attack against RSA-OAEP by James Manger in [2] . We assume that we can differentiate between errors generated during step 4 of the decryption (OU errors) and errors generated during step 5 of the decryption (integrity errors). We use the following property:
n for some z and let 0 < z ≤ p be such that z ≡ z mod p. Suppose further that C 2 is some appropriately sized bit string. If z ≥ 2 k−1 then the decryption of (C 1 , C 2 ) will fail due to an OU-error but if z < 2 k−1 then the decryption of (C 1 , C 2 ) will either be successfully completed or will fail due to an integrity error.
k−2 and let C 2 be a randomly generated, appropriately sized binary string. We ask for the decryption of the ciphertext (C 1 , C 2 ). With high probability this ciphertext will not be decrypted however if the decryption fails due to an OU error then we know that p > 2 k−1 + 2 k−2 i.e. the second most significant bit of p is a one. Otherwise p < 2 k−1 + 2 k−2 and the second most significant bit of p is a zero. Now suppose that we know the first i bits of p are 1a 2 a 3 . . . a i and we want to find the (i + 1) th bit. Let
and ask for the decryption of (C 1 , C 2 ) where C 2 is as before. Again the decryption of this ciphertext will fail with high probability however if the decryption fails due to an OU error then we know that (i + 1) th bit of p is a one, otherwise the (i + 1) th bit is a zero. We may continue this process until we find all the bits of p.
It is worth noting there are many ways in which an attacker might be able to determine which error caused the decryption to abort, see [2] for more details.
Conclusion
There is a practical chosen ciphertext attack against a poor implementation of EPOC-2 that recovers the secret key.
Key Generation Inputs k, a security parameter
Step 1 Generate two k bit primes p and q. Let n = p 2 q.
Step 2 Choose an element g ∈ Z * n such that g p−1 has order p in Z * p 2
and set h = g n .
Step 3 Let the public key be P K = (n, g, h, k) and the private key be SK = (p, q).
Step 4 Output P K and SK.
Encryption
Inputs m, a message.
P K, a public key Step 1 Pick an integer 0 < r < 2 k−1 uniformly at random.
Step 3 Let M = M GF (m||r||C 2 ).
Step
Step 3 Let r = w /w mod p.
Step 4 If r ≥ 2 k−1 then output 'ERROR' and abort.
Step 5 Let m = C 2 ⊕ KDF (r ).
Step 6 Let g = g mod q, h = h mod q and M = M GF (m ||r ||C 2 ) mod q − 1.
Step 7 Calculate C 1 = g r h M mod q. If C 1 = C 1 mod q then output m else output 'ERROR'.
where KDF () and M GF () are respectively appropriately sized Key Derivation Functions and Mask Generation Functions. 
